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Answers attached

ARP

MEMORANDUM

June 19, 1981

TO: NEA - Staff Assistant

FROM: H - G.Onufrak GO

SUBJECT: Follow-up questions to Assistant Secretary Veliotes testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 17.

Attached are follow-up questions submitted by Senator Hayakawa to be answered for the record by June 23. Use standard Q & A format, i.e. - single space the question, double space the answer, and show all appropriate clearances on a separate sheet of paper.

6/18/

QUESTIONS FOR SECRETARY VELIOTES SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HAYAKAWA

In response to the Saudi request for assistance, the Air Force deployed four E-3A (AWACS) aircraft and an array of electronic support equipment to enhance the existing air defense system. In conjunction with this request, please provide the Committee with the following information:

1. How many C-141 airlift sorties were required to transport the necessary command and control equipment for AWACS and why was this number required?

2. Describe our current capability to deploy and support quickly multiple contingency scenarios involving AWACS aircraft, if called upon.

3. Was the Air Force aware of operational command and control deficiencies that might occur in support of this AWACS deployment, and if so, what measures were taken to avoid any degradation of capability? What measures, if any, were necessary following the initial deployment of all necessary command and control equipment?

4. Describe the tactical data link capability of the equipment.

5. Did the air controllers in Saudi Arabia receive the AWACS data manually and, if so, why did this occur? Describe any other operational deficiencies with the current command and control equipment.

6. How much time would the Saudi air force have to respond to an air attack on its oil fields from Iran or any other hostile Persian Gulf state?

7. What is the present Air Force capability to effectively support multiple contingency scenarios involving AWACS aircraft?

8. How quickly could the Air Force improve and field a tactical air control system which will provide greater survivability, mobility, automation, and interoperability for any contingency?

9. How much has the Air Force requested in FY82 to meet this requirement? How much has the Air Force requested in FY82 for Operations and Maintenance for the current 407L/485L TACS? Specify how these funds will be expended if approved.

1. Q. How many C-141 airlift sorties were required to transport the necessary command and control equipment for AWACS and why was this number required?

A. Airlift for the necessary command and control equipment is as follows: Message Processing Center - 1 C-5 and 1 C-141; TSQ-91 Operations Center - 2 C-5s; Forward Air Control Post - 1 C-5 and 12 C-141s; and 3 C-141s for communications support.

2. Q. Describe our current capability to deploy and support quickly multiple contingency scenarios involving AWACS aircraft, if called upon.

A. The Air Force has War Readiness Spares Kits for a 6 AWACS and a 3 AWACS deployments. Also, AWACS aircraft are forward based at Kadena AB, Okinawa, and Keflavik, Iceland. AWACS can fly to nearly any location in 24 hours from its home base at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, or one of the forward bases. However, the capability to effectively support multiple contingencies is limited by the number of Message Processing Centers (MPC's). USAF assets total eight; however, commitments to Korea, the European Central Region and Saudi Arabia reduce the number of MPC's available for contingency scenarios to two. Assuming 24 hour coverage is desired or a long range deployment is envisioned, only one additional limited scenario could be supported outside Korea and Europe.

3. Q. Was the Air Force aware of operational command and control deficiencies that might occur in support of this AWACS deployment, and if so, what measures were taken to avoid any degradation of capability? What measures, if any, were necessary following the initial deployment of all necessary command and control equipment?

A. The Air Force was aware that deficiencies might occur in support of the AWACS deployment. Specifically, the Saudis had no capability to receive AWACS data in near-real time. To overcome this degraded situation, a Message Processing Center (MPC) was deployed to allow immediate display of pertinent information received from the AWACS. Following the initial deployment of the AWACS and the MPC, a mobile operations center was deployed in order to improve the interface with the Saudi Arabian command structure. Additionally, a back-up MPC was deployed to insure continuous 24-hour operation during periods of equipment maintenance.

4. Q. Describe the tactical data link capability of the equipment.

A. The tactical data link capability of the AWACS consists of a two-way, secure Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL-A) for the exchange of air track surveillance information and a one-way TADIL-C capability for control of TADIL-C equipped fighter aircraft. The TADIL-A capability allows the AWACS to exchange air track data with U.S. Navy ships equipped with the Navy Tactical Data System, U.S. Navy airborne early warning aircraft, and elements of the Air Force and Marine Corps ground tactical air control systems.

5. Q. Did the air controllers in Saudi Arabia receive the AWACS data manually and, if so, why did this occur? Describe any other operational deficiencies with the current command and control equipment.

A. AWACS data is received digitally at the US Message Processing Center where it can be displayed for Saudi personnel. AWACS data is also displayed at the US TSQ-91 Operations Center. AWACS information is manually provided to Saudi Arabian air defense units because they do not have the capability to receive E-3A information via data link. The major operational deficiencies with the current command and control equipment are a lack of automation at the most mobile and forward radar element, limited flexibility in tailoring the system to support small scale operations and a limited amount of ground interface equipment to establish digital data link with the E-3A.

6. Q. How much time would the Saudi air force have to respond to an air attack on its oil fields from Iran or any other hostile Persian Gulf state?

A. With AWACS on station in the area 50 miles inside the border of Saudi Arabia, AWACS would still detect low altitude intruders 150 nautical miles from their target. If the intruders were travelling at 600 knots, the Saudis would have approximately 15 minutes warning time.

Without AWACS, the Saudis are limited to line-of-sight ground-base radars with low level detection ranges of 20-30 nautical miles. These radars would provide the Saudis with about 2-4 minutes warning.

7. Q. What is the present Air Force capability to effectively support multiple contingency scenarios involving AWACS aircraft?

A. The capability to support multiple contingency scenarios is limited by the number of Message Processing Centers (MPCs). USAF assets total eight; however, commitments to Korea, the European Central Region, and Saudi Arabia reduce the number of contingency available MPCs to two. Assuming 24-hour coverage is desired or a long-range deployment is envisioned, only an additional limited scenario could be supported outside Korea and Europe.

8. Q. How quickly could the Air Force improve and field a tactical air control system which will provide a greater survivability, mobility, automation, and interoperability for any contingency?

A. The Air Force has a validated requirement to upgrade the air surveillance and control elements of the Tactical Air Control System. The time required to field an improved system depends on a number of factors such as availability of funding, extent of development effort required, and method of procurement used. In an effort to field the required capability at the earliest possible date, the Air Force has initiatied a study of a USMC development program, TAOC-85, which meets about 75 percent of the Air Force requirement. The study is to be completed by 1 Oct 81. If the study shows that changes to the TAOC-85 are feasible and FY82 funds were made available it appears that approximately two years development time could be saved -- providing a fielded system in the 1987 timeframe.

9. Q. How much has the Air Force requested in FY 82 to meet this requirement? How much has the Air Force requested in FY 82 for Operations and Maintenance for the current 407L/485L TACS? Specify how these funds will be expended if approved.

A. The Air Force has requested a total of $254.677M in FY 82 to meet the requirement of the active duty Tactical Air Control System (TACS). This includes $82.519M for 3080 procurement, $1.2M for 3600 research and development, $30.154M for operation and maintenance and $140.804M for military personnel. These figures do not include those elements of the Air National Guard TACS that are 407L equipped. ANG TACS funds are not broken out as to manual/407L units.

The Air Force has requested a total of $30.154M in FY 82 for operation and maintenance for the current active duty 407L/485L TACS. This includes our largest Tactical Air Control Wing in Germany, the 601st TAIRCWG, which has in place 15 radar elements.

If approved, the FY 82 funds indicated above will be used to sustain current TACS force structure in the CONUS and in Europe; procure badly needed tactical communications-electronics equipment, combat communications and initial spares; and permit secure communications modifications to existing tactical equipment. FY 82 funds will also enable the safety modification of the AN/TCC-30 Communications Central and entails fail safe circuit cards that will eliminate a cause for fire and damage to components. The resources will also provide for the modification of TACS Message Processing Centers (AN/TYC-10) by adding UHF-FM radios that will be used for data or voice between the MPC and the E-3A or other aircraft. Current projects within the TACS Improvements Program (485L) include the Modular Control Element, Computer Assisted Force Management System, Ultra Low Sidelobe Antenna, Anti-radiation Missile Alarm, Arm Decoy, System Trainer and Exercise Module, and Multi-Band Beacon.

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